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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate a new institutional theory explanation for 
patients making informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe. This 
views informal payments by patients to healthcare professionals as arising when formal 
institutional failures lead to an asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions and the unwritten rules of informal institutions. Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer 
survey of the prevalence of informal payments by patients in Central and Eastern European 
countries, a strong association is revealed between the level of asymmetry between the formal 
and informal institutions, and the propensity to make informal payments. The association 
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between informal payments and various formal institutional imperfections is then explored to 
evaluate which structural conditions might reduce this institutional asymmetry, and thus the 
propensity to make informal payments. The paper concludes by exploring the implications for 
tackling such informal practices. 
 
Keywords: informal payments, health services, institutional theory, institutional asymmetry, 
East-Central Europe. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, a burgeoning literature has shown how patients, particularly 
in post-socialist countries, make informal payments in return for healthcare services. These 
informal payments are commonly defined as direct contributions, made in addition to any 
contribution determined by the terms of entitlement, in cash or in kind, by patients or others 
acting on their behalf, to health care providers for services to which patients are entitled 
(Chereches, Ungureanu, Sandu, & Rus, 2013; Gaal, Jakab, & Shishkin, 2011). Other terms 
XVHG LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH WRGHVFULEHZKDWZHKHUH WHUPLQIRUPDOSD\PHQWV LQFOXGH³XQGHU-the-
WDEOH´ SD\PHQWV 'HOFKHYD %DODEDQRYD 	 0F.HH  ³under-the-counter´ payments 
(Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Delcheva et al., 1997) and ³unofficial´ payments (Ensor, 2004). 
These informal payments by patients, in addition to any official fees, are variously made in 
order to receive better treatment (Atanasova, Pavlova, & Groot, 2015; Baji, Pavlova, Gulácsi, 
& Groot, 2011; Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Habibov, 2016; Mæstad & Mwisongo, 2011; 
Liaropoulos, Siskou, Kaitelidou, Theodorou, & Katostaras, 2008; Vian, Grybosk, Sinoimeri, 
& Hall, 2006), an additional service (Ensor, 2004), due to the fear of being denied treatment 
(Tahiri et al., 2013; Vian et al., 2006)EHFDXVHWKH³GRFWRUGHPDQGHGSD\PHQW´ (Liaropoulos 
et al., 2008), because it is a tradition to give a gift (Fomenko & Stepurko, 2012; Liaropoulos et 
al., 2008; Vian et al., 2006) RUMXVW³EHFDXVHHYHU\ERG\GRHVLW´(Liaropoulos et al., 2008).  
Previous studies display the extensiveness of such informal payments, with some 35-
60% of patients making informal payments (in-kind payments included) in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine (Stepurko, Pavlova, Gryga, & Groot, 2013). Informal 
payments by patients, therefore, are not a minority practice and strategies are needed for 
tackling this phenomenon. 
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The objective of this paper is to propose and evaluate a new institutionalist theory 
explanation for patients making informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern 
European countries. From the perspective of institutionalist theory, institutions are ³WKHUXOHV
RIWKHJDPH´that exist in any society, or WKHµKXPDQO\GHYLVHGFRQVWUDLQWVWKDWVKDSHKXPDQ
LQWHUDFWLRQ¶1RUWKSDQGJRYHUQEHKDYLRXULQVRFLHW\ ,QVWLWXWLRQVDUH³WKHUXOHVRI
WKHJDPH´ZKLFKSUHVFULEHZKDWLVVRFLDOO\DFFHSWDEOHDQGWKXVERWKFRQVWUDLQDQGHQFRXUDJH
different activities (North, 1990). All societies have both formal institutions (i.e., codified laws 
and regulations) that set out the legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions which 
are the ³VRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\XQZULWWHQWKDWDUHFUHDWHGFRmmunicated and enforced 
RXWVLGHRIRIILFLDOO\VDQFWLRQHGFKDQQHOV´ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727), and are the 
norms, values and beliefs held by citizens reflecting their individual morale about what is 
acceptable (Denzau and North, 1994). TKH WHUP ³LQVWLWXWLRQ´ FRPPRQO\ DSSOLHV WR ERWK
informal institutions such as the behaviour patterns in a society, and to formal institutions 
created by entities such as the government and public services. Therefore, by adopting an 
institutionalist theory lens, two different approaches to explaining informal payments by 
patients can be adopted. Firstly, such informal payments can be explained as resulting from 
formal institutional imperfections in healthcare services and, secondly, informal payments can 
be seen to arise when the norms, practices and values of the informal institutions are not in 
symmetry with the formal rules of the game. Indeed, the greater is this institutional asymmetry, 
the higher is the likelihood of informal payments. 
This paper consequently advances knowledge in three ways. Theoretically, and drawing 
inspiration from institutionalist theory (North, 1990) and from the application of institutionalist 
theory to the study of the wider informal economy beyond healthcare (Williams & Horodnic, 
2015a, 2015b), we here for the first time evaluate the validity of explaining informal payments 
by patients for health services in Central and Eastern Europe through the lens of institutionalist 
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theory. Until now, neither the formal institutional imperfections nor the institutional asymmetry 
theses have been evaluated as explanations for patients making informal payments in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Empirically, meanwhile, this paper reports an evaluation of the cross-
national variations in the prevalence and determinants of informal payments in 11 countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of policy implications, knowledge is here advanced by 
identifying the changes required in both the formal and informal institutions in order to tackle 
informal payments in healthcare.    
The next section therefore, briefly reviews the previous literature on informal payments 
by patients in the health services sector, followed by the outline of a new institutionalist theory 
for explaining this phenomenon. The outcome will be a set of hypotheses regarding the 
association between informal payments by patients and: a) the degree of asymmetry between 
formal and informal institutions and b) formal institutional imperfections. The third section 
then reports the methodology and dataset used to evaluate the validity of this new theoretical 
explanation, namely a probit regression analysis with sample selection (using a 2013 
Euroabarometer survey undertaken in 11 Central and Eastern European nations), followed in 
the fourth section by a reporting of the results. The fifth and final section then discusses the 
implications for theory and draws conclusions on the policy implications of this new way of 
explaining informal payments.  
 
Informal payments by patients in Central and Eastern Europe: an institutionalist 
approach       
Over the past two decades, an expanding literature has shown how in many developing and 
transition countries, patients make an additional informal payment to healthcare staff apart 
from the official fees for health services. This has been identified in cross-national studies 
conducted across 35 European countries (Tambor, Pavlova, Golinowska, Sowada, & Groot, 
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2013), six Central and Eastern European countries (Stepurko, Pavlova, Gryga, & Groot, 
2015a), Central Asia (Rechel et al., 2012) and 33 African countries (Kankeu & Ventelou, 
2016). It has also been identified in single nation studies conducted in for example Bulgaria 
(Atanasova et al., 2015; Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Delcheva et al., 1997; Pavlova, Groot, 
& van Merode, 2002; Rechel, Blackburn, Spencer, & Rechel, 2011), Poland (Chawla, Berman, 
Windak, & Kulis, 2004; Stepurko, Pavlova, Gryga, Murauskiene, & Groot, 2015b), Hungary 
(Baji et al., 2011; Baji, Pavlova, Gulácsi, & Groot, 2012a; Baji, Pavlova, Gulácsi, Zsófia, & 
Groot, 2012b; Baji, Pavlova, Gulacsi, & Groot, 2013; Gaal, Evetovits, & McKee, 2006; Szende 
& Culyer, 2006), Lithuania (Riklikiene, Jarasiunaite, & Starkiene, 2014; Stepurko et al., 
2015b), Russia (Fotaki, 2009; Kutzin, Jakab, & Cashin, 2010); Ukraine (Danyliv, Pavlova, 
Gryga, & Groot, 2015; Stepurko et al., 2015b) and Moldova (Mokhtari & Ashtari, 2012). These 
studies report marked cross-national variations in the proportion of patients making informal 
payments, ranging from 43% in Bulgaria (Delcheva et al., 1997) to 25% in Moldova (Mokhtari 
& Ashtari, 2012) and 23% in Russia (Kutzin et al., 2010). However, these results on the 
prevalence of informal payments are extracted from different studies using different 
methodologies and need to be cautiously interpreted.  
To explain such cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal payments for 
health services in Central and Eastern Europe, an institutionalist theory approach is here for the 
first time adopted. Institutionalist theory (Baumol & Blinder, 2008; North, 1990) has been 
widely applied in health services research, such as to explain the adoption of health information 
technology (Fareed, Bazzoli, Mick, & Harless, 2015; Nilashi, Ahmadi, Ahani, Ravangard, & 
bin Ibrahim, 2016; Sherer, 2010), healthcare reform (Contandriopoulos & Brousselle, 2010), 
patient-centred preventive care (Ledderer, 2010) and healthcare expenditure (Burnett et al., 
2016). Therefore, following advances in institutionalist theory in relation to the wider study of 
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the informal economy (Williams & Horodnic, 2015a, 2015b), two different approaches to 
explaining informal payments by patients can be adopted.  
On the one hand, informal payments by patients can be explained as resulting from 
formal institutional imperfections in healthcare services. Indeed, previous literature has 
identified a number of structural conditions that lead to informal payments, including legal-
ethical, social-cultural (the social custom of expressing gratitude through informal payments), 
governance failures (e.g. poor accountability) and economic (e.g. underfunding in the face of 
growing healthcare needs and expectations; explanations based on economic behaviour) 
conditions (Cohen, 2012; Gaal & McKee, 2005; Gaal & McKee, 2004; Tambor, Pavlova, 
Golinowska, Sowada, & Groot, 2013).  
On the other hand, however, it has been recognised that focusing upon solely formal 
institutional imperfections ignores the role played by informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015; 
North, 1990). It is here asserted that all societies have both laws and regulations (i.e., formal 
institutions) that set out the legal rules of the game (Baumol & Blinder, 2008; North, 1990; 
Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009), as well as informal institutions, which are the 
³VRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\XQZULWWHQWKDWDUHFUHated, communicated and enforced outside 
RIRIILFLDOO\VDQFWLRQHGFKDQQHOV´+HOPNH	/HYLWVN\S The norms, values and 
EHOLHIV RI D VRFLHW\¶V LQIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV FDQ EH HLWKHU ³complementary´ if they reinforce 
formal institutions, or ³substitutive´ if the rules they prescribe are incompatible with the formal 
institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990). Therefore, even if there are formal 
institutional imperfections (e.g. poor access to healthcare), informal payments by patients 
would not necessarily occur unless the socially shared norms, values and beliefs of patients 
were not aligned with the formal rules. If formal and informal institutions do not align (there 
is asymmetry between formal and informal institutions), the result is the presence of informal 
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payments in healthcare system, which, although formally illegitimate, is deemed socially 
legitimate (e.g., ³HYHU\ERG\GRHVLW´/LDURSRXORVHWDO  
Informal payments by patients are thus here represented as endeavour occurring outside 
of formal institutional prescriptions but within the norms, values and beliefs of informal 
institutions and are YLHZHGDVDULVLQJ³EHFDXVHRIWKHLQFRQJUXHQFHEHWZHHQZKDWLVGHILQHGDV
OHJLWLPDWHE\IRUPDODQG LQIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV´:HEEHWDOS The greater the 
asymmetry between these formal and informal institutions, the more prevalent are informal 
payments. To test the validity of this institutionalist perspective that the likelihood of making 
informal payments for health services is associated with the degree of institutional asymmetry, 
the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H1): the prevalence of informal payments is higher 
in populations with greater asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions. 
 
This thesis can be tested not only on a cross-national level but also across various demographic 
and socio-economic groups. Previous studies reveal that the prevalence of informal payments 
for health services is greater among women (Baji et al., 2012b; Balabanova & McKee, 2002; 
Mokhtari & Ashtari, 2012; Riklikiene et al., 2014; Stepurko et al., 2015a; Williams, Horodnic, 
& Horodnic, 2016), younger people (Arsenijevic, Pavlova, & Groot, 2015; Balabanova & 
McKee, 2002; Danyliv et al., 2015; Tomini & Maarse, 2011; Tomini, Groot, & Pavlova, 
2012a), those spending with more years in education (Arsenijevic et al., 2015; Baji et al., 
2012b; Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Kaitelidou et al., 2013; Riklikiene et al., 2014; Stepurko 
et al., 2015a; Tomini et al., 2012a), the employed (Kaitelidou et al., 2013), married people 
(Tomini et al., 2012a), those living in smaller households (Baji et al., 2012b; Stepurko et al., 
2015a; Tomini et al., 2012a; Tomini, Groot, & Pavlova, 2012b), rural populations (Danyliv et 
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al., 2015; Tomini & Groot, 2013; Tomini & Maarse, 2011) and lower-income groups (Kankeu 
& Ventelou, 2016; Szende & Culyer, 2006; Tengilimoglu, Güzel, Toygar, Akinci, & 
Dziegielewski, 2015; Tomini & Groot, 2013). By testing this hypothesis, whether these 
populations also have a higher institutional asymmetry and therefore higher propensity to make 
informal payments can be evaluated. 
It is important however, not only to test this new institutional asymmetry thesis. London 
et al. (2014) display that the influence of informal institutions becomes stronger in the presence 
of formal institutional imperfections and thus institutional asymmetry can be argued to prevail 
as a result of formal institutional imperfections in healthcare services. For instance, lower 
expenditures on healthcare (associated with lower salaries for healthcare professionals) can be 
associated with higher institutional asymmetry and consequently the higher prevalence of 
informal payments (i.e., the patient will consider it an acceptable and appropriate behaviour 
³WRFRPSHQVDWH´ WKHPHGLFDO VWDII IRU WKH UHFHLYHGVHUYLFHVMoreover, the poor quality of 
government, expressed in a lack of capacity to enforce policies or ability to provide incentives 
to encourage adherence to the formal rules (i.e., the codified laws and regulations), may favour 
informal payments by patients.        
Viewed through an institutional lens, therefore, the structural conditions identified in 
previous literature as associated with the greater prevalence of informal payments need to be 
evaluated as determinants of the level of institutional asymmetry. These formal institutional 
imperfections identified in previous literature as associated with the greater prevalence of 
informal payments include not only the existence of formal institutional voids, such as lower 
expenditures on healthcare (Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Tambor et al., 2013) and inefficient 
resource allocation which results in a low range and reach of healthcare services (Baji et al., 
2013; Gaal & McKee, 2004; Gaal, Belli, McKee, & Szócska, 2006; Kutzin et al., 2010; Lewis, 
2002; Tambor et al., 2013; Tomini & Groot, 2013), but also formal institutional inefficiencies, 
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such as the poor quality of government, poorer performing healthcare systems and those 
concentrating on curative rather than preventative care (Cohen, 2012; Fotaki, 2009; Gaal & 
McKee, 2004; Lewis, 2002; Rechel et al., 2011; Stepurko et al., 2015b; Tambor et al., 2013; 
Tomini & Groot, 2013). Moreover, other theories explaining informal payments such as ³inxit´ 
theory (Gaal & McKee, 2004) or the ³alternative politics´ theory (Cohen, 2012) are also 
grounded in institutional failure and citizens dissatisfaction with healthcare services. Therefore, 
to specify what precise formal institutional failings are associated with a greater likelihood that 
informal payments will be made by patients, and to identify what changes are required in formal 
institutions so as to reduce informal payments, the following hypotheses can be evaluated: 
 
Formal institutional imperfections hypothesis (H2): the prevalence of informal 
payments is higher in healthcare systems with greater formal institutional imperfections. 
 
Formal institutional voids (H2A): the prevalence of informal payments is higher in 
healthcare systems with greater formal institutional voids. 
Lack of financial resources (H2A1): the prevalence of informal payments is higher 
in healthcare systems with lower levels of healthcare expenditure. 
Lack of a basic health service (H2A2): the prevalence of informal payments is 
higher in healthcare systems with a lower range and reach of health service 
provision. 
Formal institutional inefficiencies (H2B): the prevalence of informal payments is 
higher in healthcare systems with greater formal institutional inefficiencies. 
Quality of government (H2B1): the prevalence of informal payments is higher in 
countries with a lower quality of government. 
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Health system performance (H2B2): the prevalence of informal payments is higher 
in healthcare systems with lower level of performance. 
Resource misallocations (H2B3): the prevalence of informal payments is higher in 
healthcare systems focusing more on curative rather than preventative health 
services.  
 
Methodology 
 
To evaluate the relationship between the likelihood of informal payments by patients and the 
degree of institutional asymmetry, along with the formal institutional imperfections associated 
with higher informal payments, we here use an extensive dataset, namely Special 
(XUREDURPHWHU1Rµ&RUUXSWLRQ¶FRQGXFWHGDVSDUWRIZDYHRIthe Eurobarometer 
survey (European Commission, 2014a). This survey involved 11,100 face-to-face interviews 
conducted in February and March 2013 across the 11 Central and Eastern European countries, 
of which 8,090 reported that they had visited a public healthcare practitioner or health care 
institution in the 12 months prior to the survey. Here, only those respondents are kept for which 
data on each and every variable analysed is available, which totals 10,765 interviews, of which 
7,816 respondents have visited a public healthcare practitioner or health care institution. 
The interviews were undertaken in the national language with adults aged 15 years and 
older, based on a common questionnaire, and a multi-stage random (probability) sampling 
methodology which ensure that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, each 
country as well as each level of sample was representative in proportion to its population size. 
Thus, the sample represents the whole territory of the countries surveyed according to the Nuts 
II regions, or equivalent (details in the Special Eurobarometer No. 397 methodology; European 
Commission, 2014b). For the univariate analysis therefore, we employed the sampling 
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weighting scheme as recommended in the wider literature (Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 2015; 
Winship & Radbill, 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology (European Commission, 
2014b). Regarding the multivariate analysis, there is debate over whether such a weighting 
scheme should be used (Pfefferman, 1994; Sharon & Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2015). Following 
the majority opinion in the literature and previous studies on the wider informal economy (e.g. 
Williams & Horodnic, 2016), we here have not used the weighting scheme for the multivariate 
analysis. 
The dependent variable is here whether patients made extra informal payments apart 
from the official fees. This is based on their response to the question: ³Apart from official fees 
did you have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift to a nurse or a doctor, or make a 
donation to the hospital?´. To evaluate H1 regarding whether the prevalence of informal 
payments is associated with the degree of institutional asymmetry, an Institutional Asymmetry 
Index for each respondent is constructed. Participants were asked to rate on a 3-point Likert 
scale (where 1 means always acceptable and 3 means never acceptable) the acceptability of 
three behaviours, namely: a) to give money, b) to give a gift or c) to do a favour, in order to get 
something from the public administration or a public service. The index has been calculated 
here using the mean score across these three attitudinal questions. A lower index value indicates 
WKDWWKHQRUPVYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIVRIDVRFLHW\¶VLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHnot aligned with those 
of the formal institutions (i.e., patients are not seeking to adhere to the ³legal rules of the 
game´). The lower the index value, the higher is the institutional asymmetry. 
Meanwhile, to analyse the association between informal payments and formal 
institutional imperfections (H2), akin to previous studies on informal payments, various 
country-level structural conditions are considered (e.g. Belli, Shahriari, & Gotzadze, 2004; 
Bloom, Han, & Li, 2001; Cohen, 2012), whilst holding constant the Institutional Asymmetry 
Index and a range of individual-level variables (gender, age, employment status and whether 
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the respondent lives in an urban/rural area). Similar socio-demographic, socio-economic and 
spatial characteristics were used in previous studies evaluating the prevalence of informal 
payments (Baji et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2016).     
 To evaluate the lack of financial resources hypothesis (H2A1) and the lack of a basic 
health service hypothesis (H2A2), the indicators used are: 
 Level of total expenditure on health services expressed as a percentage of GDP (World 
Bank, 2013). 
 Range and reach of health services provided in a country ± a sub-component of the 
Euroopean Health Consumer Index, 2013 (Health Consumer Powerhouse [HCP], 
2013). 
To evaluate the relationship between informal payments and governance (H2B1) and health 
system performance (H2B2), the analysed indicators are: 
 European Quality of Government Index ± this includes both perceptions and 
experiences with public sector services. The index is standardised with a mean of zero, 
with higher scores implying a higher quality of government (Charron, Dijkstra, & 
Lapuente, 2015). 
 Outcomes ± a sub-component of the European Health Consumer Index, 2013 (HCP, 
2013). 
To evaluate resource misallocations by formal institutions (H2B3), such as when focusing on 
curative health services rather than prevention, we here use: 
 Prevention ± a sub-component of the European Health Consumer Index, 2013 (HCP, 
2013).  
To evaluate the hypotheses, and after a descriptive analysis, a probit regression with sample 
selection is conducted. Of all interviews in the analysed subset of the dataset, some were 
conducted with respondents who have visited a public healthcare practitioner or health care 
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institution. For these health service users, we aim to investigate whether they made extra 
informal payments apart from the official fees. Indeed, informal payments are observable only 
if the respondent has used health services. Therefore, considering the selection issue, we use a 
selection equation which contain an indicator for patients` age, their education and the area 
where they live (country, urban/rural) as predictors for the propensity to visit a public 
healthcare practitioner or health care institution. According to previous studies, peoples` age, 
education and geographical area are considered factors influencing healthcare utilisation 
(G¶8YD	-RQHV*HLWRQD=DYUDV, & Kyriopoulos, 2007; Maurer, 2007; Sirven & Or, 
2010; Zyaambo, Siziya, & Fylkesnes, 2012).             
      Given the significant correlation between some macro-level indicators (Table A2 in 
Appendix), the variable investigating health system performance (Outcomes) is added 
separately to the individual-level variables (i.e., the Institutional Asymmetry Index and socio-
economic control variables) to evaluate whether it is significantly associated with the 
propensity to make informal payments. Below, we report the findings. 
 
Findings 
 
Of the 10,765 face-to-face interviews undertaken in 2013 in Central and Eastern Europe, 7,816 
had visited a public healthcare practitioner or institution in the past 12 months, of whom 9% 
had made informal payments for a public healthcare service. Extrapolating from this, in the 
year prior to the survey, some one in 11 Central and Eastern European citizens using healthcare 
services made informal payments. 
However, not all countries and population groups display the same propensity to make 
informal payments. Starting with the cross-national variations, and as Table 1 displays, making 
informal payments is more common in Romania (30% of those using healthcare services made 
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informal payments), Lithuania (22%), Hungary (10%), Slovakia (9%), Bulgaria (9%) and 
Latvia (7%), and lower in the Czech Republic (4%), Slovenia (3%), Estonia (3%), Poland (3%) 
and Croatia (less than 3%). Indeed, although just 17% of the healthcare users surveyed were 
from Romania and Lithuania, more than half (54%) of those making informal payments in 
Central and Eastern Europe were from these two countries. This practice, therefore, is heavily 
concentrated in these two countries. Similarly, in a study conducted in July±August 2010 in six 
Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Ukraine), using national representative samples, Stepurko et al. (2015a) show that the share of 
healthcare users who report informal payments is the highest in these two countries (35% in 
Romania and 25% in Lithuania).      
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Not only is the practice of making informal payments concentrated in certain countries, it is 
also more prevalent in some population groups rather than others. Examining those population 
groups more likely to make informal payments, Table 1 displays that patients under 47 years 
old are more likely to give extra payments or valuable gifts for healthcare services than older 
patients (10% compared with 8%). Indeed, although just 50% of the patients surveyed were 
under 47 years old, they constituted 58% of all patients making informal payments. Employed 
patients are also more likely than unemployed patients to make informal payments (11% 
compared with 8%), and women more likely than men (10% compared with 8%). Similarly, 
Stepurko et al. (2015a) found that being female (in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania) 
increases the probability of making informal payments for health services. 
To evaluate whether these cross-national and socio-economic variations in informal 
payments are related with the level of institutional asymmetry, columns three and four in Table 
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1 report the variations in the Institutional Asymmetry Index. This reveals that Institutional 
Asymmetry Index is lower (and thus institutional asymmetry is greater) for patients making 
informal payments (2.37) compared with patients not making informal payments (2.67). The 
same trend can be identified in the socio-economic variations in the Institutional Asymmetry 
Index. Indeed, most Central and Eastern European countries reporting a higher prevalence of 
informal payments by patients have higher levels of institutional asymmetry among patients 
making informal payments than among those who have not: 2.40 and 2.74 in Romania, 2.24 
and 2.44 in Lithuania, 1.96 and 2.45 in Hungary, and 2.02 and 2.47 in Slovakia. Similarly, with 
a value of 2.17 for patients making informal payments and 2.42 for patients not making 
informal payments, Latvia has a high level of institutional asymmetry. Lower levels of 
institutional asymmetry, meanwhile, exist among patients making informal payments than 
those not in Slovenia (2.83 and 2.84), Estonia (2.34 and 2.73) and Poland (2.74 and 2.77). 
Analysing these descriptive statistics therefore, the tentative finding is that, although 
ubiquitous across all regions and socio-economic groups, informal payments are generally 
more prevalent in populations with a greater level of institutional asymmetry.  
To determine firstly, whether the association between informal payments and 
institutional asymmetry (H1) is significant when other control variables are taken into account 
and held constant, and secondly, to determine the country-level structural conditions (formal 
institutional imperfections ± H2) significantly associated with the greater prevalence of 
informal payments, Table 2 reports the results of a probit regression with sample selection. 
Indeed, the likelihood-ratio test of independent equations conclusively rejects the null 
hypothesis with an estimated rho of 0.90, 0.94 and 0.96 between the two equations` errors, 
indicating that ignoring the selection into healthcare user status would render the estimates of 
univariate probit equation for informal payments equation inconsistent. In the selection 
equation, a significant positive association between healthcare utilisation and age and 
17 
 
education is revealed. Moreover, individuals living in urban areas are significantly more likely 
to use health services than those living in rural areas, confirming therefore previous findings in 
the literature on healthcare utilisation (e.g. Geitona et al., 2007; Maurer, 2007; Zyaambo et al., 
2012).   
Given this justification for considering a selection issue, the first stage of the analysis 
involves individual-level characteristics and dummies for countries and the second stage of the 
analysis individual and macro-level variables to investigate structural conditions (details on the 
variables used in the analysis are in Table A1 in Appendix). 
    
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The first row in Models 1-3 in Table 2 reveals that the prevalence of informal payments is 
strongly associated with higher levels of institutional asymmetry (i.e., a low Institutional 
Asymmetry Index). This is the case in all models, whether only individual-level variables are 
analysed, or country-level structural conditions added. As institutional asymmetry increases, 
the prevalence of informal payments significantly increases (confirming H1). Moreover, Model 
1 identifies that women are more likely to make informal payments than men, as are older than 
younger patients. Patients living in urban areas are also more likely to make informal payments 
than patients living in rural areas. However, no significant correlation with informal payments 
is found with respect to employment status. Moreover, when comparing other countries with 
those in the Czech Republic, patients in Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary 
are significantly more likely to make informal payments. These findings are in line with the 
results of Tambor et al. (2013) who classify Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and 
Hungary in the group of countries with widespread informal payments. 
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Models 2 and 3 in Table 2 meanwhile, evaluate the formal institutional imperfection 
hypothesis (H2) to explain informal payments. Model 2 reveals that informal payments are 
significantly higher in countries with lower levels of health expenditure as a share of GDP 
(confirming H2A1). To evaluate the lack of a basic health service hypothesis, Model 2 provides 
strong evidence that informal payments are greater in health systems with a low range and 
reach of services provision (confirming H2A2). Turning to the formal institutional 
inefficiencies hypotheses, Model 2 reveals strong evidence that informal payments are higher 
in countries with lower qualities of governance (confirming H2B1) and Model 3 reveals strong 
evidence that informal payments are higher in countries with low health outcomes (confirming 
H2B2). Resource misallocation as a formal institutional inefficiency is evaluated also in Model 
2. The finding is that informal payments are significantly more common in health systems with 
low quality preventive care (confirming H2B3). Similar results were obtained by Tambor et al. 
(2013) who found that informal payments are widespread in countries having the lowest share 
of public health expenditure and the lowest government effectiveness. These findings are also 
in line with legal and economic explanations of informal payments by patients who explicitly 
linked this phenomenon to the imperfections of the healthcare system (Cohen, 2012; Gaal & 
McKee, 2005; Gaal & McKee, 2004). 
      To graphically display the relationship between informal patient payments, institutional 
asymmetry and formal institutional imperfections and to help interpret the findings, Figure 1 
presents the predicted probabilities of a ³representative´ patient in Central and Eastern Europe 
making informal payments, according to their level of institutional asymmetry and various 
country-level structural conditions. By taking the mean and modal values of other independent 
variables, the representative patient in Central and Eastern Europe is here a 47+ years-old 
unemployed women, located in an urban area in a country with average values of the analysed 
macro-level indicators. As graphically displayed in Figure 1A, as institutional asymmetry 
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decreases, the predicted odds of this representative patient making informal payments becomes 
smaller. Moreover, if analysing Figure 1B.1-5, the finding is that as institutional asymmetry 
decreases and country-level structural conditions improve, the predicted odds of the 
representative patient making informal payments in Central and Eastern Europe becomes 
smaller. These graphs therefore graphically portray how patients living in countries with higher 
expenditure levels on health (Figure 1B.1), a larger range and reach of health service provision 
(Figure 1B.2), higher qualities of government (Figure 1B.3), a higher-performing health system 
(Figure 1B.5), and with a healthcare system oriented towards prevention (Figure 1B.4), have 
lower predicted odds of making informal payments. In consequence, formal institutional 
failings appear to engender greater institutional asymmetry and therefore higher predicted odds 
of making informal payments.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper has proposed and evaluated a new way of explaining informal payments by patients 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing inspiration from institutional theory, it has shown that 
when formal and informal institutions are not aligned, informal practices are more prevalent 
that are embedded in unwritten socially shared rules but ³illegitimate´ in terms of the formal 
written rules. The higher is the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, the greater 
is the likelihood of informal payments. Using probit regression analysis with sample selection, 
this has been revealed to be the case when both the individual level variables alone are analysed 
(i.e., socio-economic characteristics) and when country level variables (i.e. structural 
conditions related to formal institutional imperfections) are evaluated along with the 
individual-level ones. 
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To reduce informal payments in consequence, policy will need to reduce this 
institutional asymmetry. This necessitates changes in the norms, practices and beliefs that 
constitute the informal institutions as well as the formal institutional imperfections that lead to 
institutional asymmetry and thus informal payments. 
To change the informal institutions in order to align them with the formal rules, three 
policy initiatives can be pursued. Firstly, advertising campaigns (targeting the groups identified 
above with high levels of institutional asymmetry) can be employed, such as informing patients 
of the costs and risks of making informal payments for healthcare services. Secondly, 
normative appeals to both patients and healthcare professionals can be employed in a bid to 
reduce the tendency to either pay or ask for informal payments. Certainly, as previous studies 
indicate, anticorruption measures in association with awareness campaigns have proven to be 
a strong combination in reducing informal payments in Eastern European countries (Danyliv 
et al., 2015; Stepurko et al., 2013). And third and finally, educational campaigns are required 
to inform citizens about the benefits of paying taxes so as to pay for public services such as 
healthcare (e.g., so that higher salaries can be paid) and informal payments reduced because 
the healthcare professionals would no longer demand informal payments and patients no longer 
feel the need to make such informal payments.  
To improve the social contract between governments, and patients and medical staff, 
nevertheless, formal institutions also need to change. On the one hand, and as models 2 and 3 
in Table 2 reveal, informal payments are more common in systems with low expenditure on 
health and a low range and reach of services provision. On the other hand, governments also 
need to pursue modernisation and wider economic and social developments, with the models 
revealing how countries with lower quality government, lower health outcomes and systems 
focusing on curative health services rather than preventive services, have a higher prevalence 
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The major limitation of this paper, nevertheless, is that the quantitative analyses has 
only shown that institutional asymmetry is a result of formal institutional imperfections. 
Therefore, whilst the current institutional asymmetry theory towards informal payments by 
SDWLHQWVKDVH[SORUHGWKHLVVXHRI³YHUWLFDOWUXVW´EHWZHHQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVJRYHUQPHQWDQG
informal institutions/ patients), another important issue that has been under-researched are the 
VRFLDO QRUPV 6RFLDO QRUPV UHSUHVHQW WKH ³KRUL]RQWDO WUXVW´ DPRQJVW SDWLHQWV DQG DPRQJVW
healthcare professionals). Thus, patients and healthcare professionals are more likely to 
make/accept informal payments if they live in a society where the phenomenon is considered 
widespread (they might be less worried about the sanctions and they might consider that 
³HYHU\ERG\ GRHV LW´ )XWXUH TXDOLWDWLYH DQG TXDQWLWDWLYH UHVHDUFK LV WKHUHIRUH required to 
H[SORUHWKH³KRUL]RQWDOWUXVW´LQLQIRUPDOSD\PHQWVE\SDWLHQWV6HFRQGO\WKHUHLVDSRWHQWLDO
bias related to whether respondents answered honestly, given that the subject matter is related 
to illegal practices, and thus, the reported percentages might be underestimated. 
In sum, this paper has advanced a new institutionalist explanation for patients making 
informal payments Central and Eastern Europe. Whether this institutional asymmetry approach 
is more widely valid as an explanation for informal payments beyond Central and Eastern 
Europe now needs evaluating. If this paper stimulates such evaluations, then one intention of 
this paper will have been achieved. However, if this paper contributes to stimulating Central 
and Eastern European governments to recognise how informal payments result from 
institutional asymmetry and to begin tackling the structural conditions that lead to this 
asymmetry, then it will have achieved its fuller intention. 
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Table 1. Informal payments and institutional asymmetry in Central and Eastern Europe: by 
socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial characteristics  
  
Healthcare 
users 
 
Healthcare users: respondents visiting a public healthcare 
practitioner or institution (last 12 months) 
  
 
Institutional Asymmetry 
Index  
Informal 
payments 
 Percent of: 
  
 
Informal 
payments  
- YES 
Informal 
payments  
- NO 
  
All patients 
making 
informal 
payments 
All 
patients 
 
 no.  - -  %  % % 
Central & Eastern 
Europe 
 
7,816  2.37 2.67  8.95  100 100 
Gender 
 
         
Male 
 
3,162  2.30 2.66  7.72  37.18 43.09 
Female 
 
4,654  2.40 2.67  9.88  62.82 56.91 
Age (47 years) 
 
         
Bellow mean 
 
3,485  2.41 2.65  10.34  57.76 50.01 
Above mean 
 
4,331  2.31 2.69  7.56  42.24 49.99 
Employment 
 
         
Employed 
 
3,616  2.39 2.64  10.56  53.39 45.23 
Unemployed 
 
4,200  2.34 2.69  7.61  46.61 54.77 
Area 
 
         
Rural 
 
2,796  2.44 2.67  8.53  33.99 35.67 
Urban 
 
5,020  2.33 2.67  9.18  66.01 64.33 
Country 
 
         
Romania 
 
470  2.40 2.74  29.65  46.07 13.90 
Lithuania 
 
737  2.24 2.44  21.60  8.26 3.42 
Hungary 
 
722  1.96 2.45  9.86  10.83 9.82 
Slovakia 
 
806  2.02 2.47  8.74  5.97 6.12 
Bulgaria 
 
657  2.48 2.70  8.55  6.89 7.21 
Latvia 
 
768  2.17 2.42  6.72  1.40 1.87 
Czech Republic 
 
769  2.42 2.58  3.96  5.07 11.47 
Slovenia 
 
729  2.83 2.84  3.27  0.78 2.13 
Estonia 
 
736  2.34 2.73  3.09  0.40 1.16 
Poland 
 
719  2.74 2.77  3.03  13.04 38.51 
Croatia 
 
703  2.33 2.66  2.62  1.28 4.38 
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Table 2. Probit regression (with sample selection) of the propensity to make informal 
payments in Central and Eastern Europe 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
IN
FO
R
M
A
L 
PA
Y
M
EN
TS
 
Institutional Asymmetry  -0.595 *** (0.044)  -0.654 *** (0.039)  -0.634 *** (0.038) 
Female  0.112 *** (0.041)  0.010 ** (0.040)  0.089 ** (0.040) 
Age (exact)  0.003 ** (0.001)  0.003 ** (0.001)  0.003 ** (0.001) 
Employment (Employed): Unemployed  -0.057  (0.042)  -0.039  (0.041)  -0.043  (0.041) 
Area (Rural): Urban  0.134 *** (0.044)  0.147 *** (0.043)  0.155 *** (0.042) 
Country (Czech Republic)             
Estonia  -0.090  (0.123)         
Hungary  0.307 *** (0.102)         
Latvia  0.149  (0.106)         
Lithuania  0.795 *** (0.095)         
Poland  -0.037  (0.124)         
Slovakia  0.347 *** (0.102)         
Slovenia  0.101  (0.120)         
Bulgaria  0.362 *** (0.104)         
Romania  0.896 *** (0.099)         
Croatia  -0.146  (0.126)         
Health expenditure, % GDP      -0.035 * (0.021)     
Range and reach of services provided1      -0.006 *** (0.001)     
European Quality of Government Index      -0.243 *** (0.046)     
Prevention1      -0.011 *** (0.003)     
Outcomes1          -0.005 *** (0.001) 
Constant  -0.662 *** (0.146)  1.111 *** (0.295)  0.432 *** (0.133) 
H
EA
LT
H
CA
RE
 U
SE
R
S 
Age (exact)  0.015 *** (0.001)  0.015 *** (0.001)  0.015 *** (0.001) 
Area (Rural): Urban  0.145 *** (0.028)  0.145 *** (0.028)  0.146 *** (0.028) 
Age education ended (-15 years)             
16-19  -0.003  (0.047)  -0.001  (0.047)  -0.001  (0.047) 
20+  0.131 ** (0.051)  0.133 *** (0.051)  0.133 *** (0.051) 
Still studying  0.260 *** (0.071)  0.263 *** (0.071)  0.264 *** (0.071) 
No full-time education  0.247  (0.237)  0.239  (0.236)  0.240  (0.236) 
Country (Czech Republic)             
Estonia  -0.189 *** (0.063)  -0.176 *** (0.063)  -0.178 *** (0.063) 
Hungary  -0.175 *** (0.063)  -0.181 *** (0.063)  -0.158 ** (0.062) 
Latvia  0.001  (0.064)  0.017  (0.063)  0.029  (0.063) 
Lithuania  -0.134 ** (0.064)  -0.211 *** (0.064)  -0.228 *** (0.064) 
Poland  -0.155 ** (0.064)  -0.132 ** (0.063)  -0.134 ** (0.063) 
Slovakia  0.182 *** (0.066)  0.176 *** (0.066)  0.171 *** (0.066) 
Slovenia  -0.174 *** (0.063)  -0.185 *** (0.063)  -0.182 *** (0.063) 
Bulgaria  -0.382 *** (0.062)  -0.335 *** (0.062)  -0.368 *** (0.061) 
Romania  -0.831 *** (0.061)  -0.902 *** (0.061)  -0.927 *** (0.061) 
Croatia  -0.230 *** (0.063)  -0.214 *** (0.062)  -0.214 *** (0.062) 
Constant  -0.010  (0.082)  -0.009  (0.082)  -0.008  (0.082) 
Observations  10,765  10,765  10,765 
Censored  2,949  2,949  2,949 
Uncensored  7,816  7,816  7,816 
Ȥ2  501.46  406.65  371.82 
p>  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Rho  0.900  0.944  0.958 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): p>  0.0365  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parantheses; Coefficients compared to the benchmark 
category, shown in brackets; 1 Sub-component of the European Health Consumer Index (2013) 
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and Eastern Europe, by institutional asymmetry level and formal institutional imperfections  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of variables used (n = 7,816) 
    
Variables Definition Mode or mean  Min / Max 
Institutional 
Asymmetry 
Constructed index of self-reported acceptability 
towards three behaviours: to give money, a gift 
or to do a favour for public services. 
2.6 1 / 3 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the patient. Female (57%) 0 / 1 
Age Patient exact age. 47 years old 15 / 92 
Employment Dummy for the employment status of the patient. Unemployed (55%) 0 / 1 
Area Dummy for the area where the respondent lives. Urban (64%) 0 / 1 
Country Country where the patient lives in categories. Poland (39%) 1 / 11 
Health expenditure, % 
GDP 
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product. 6.8 6 / 9 
Range and reach of 
services provided 
Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index, 
evaluating European health systems by Range 
and reach of services provided.   
75.2 50 / 113 
European Quality of 
Government Index 
Perceptions and experiences regarding the 
quality of government. -0.7 
-1.6 / 
0.1 
Prevention 
Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index, 
evaluating European health systems considering 
Prevention. 
70.1 52 / 83 
Outcomes 
Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index, 
evaluating European health systems by 
Outcomes. 
123.6 83 / 190 
Informal payments 
(dependent variable) 
Dummy variable for patient payments (apart 
from official fees), in return to public healthcare 
services. 
No informal 
payments (91%) 0 / 1 
    
      
  
35 
 
Table A2. Correlations: institutional imperfection variables 
     
 
Health expenditure, 
% GDP (2013) 
Range and reach of 
services provided 
(2013) 
European Quality of 
Government Index 
(2013) 
Prevention 
(2013) 
Range and reach of 
services provided (2013) 
0.214  
*** 
   
European Quality of 
Government Index (2013) 
-0.013 0.501 
*** 
  
Prevention (2013) 0.310 
*** 
-0.002 -0.129 
*** 
 
Outcomes (2013) 0.303 
*** 
0.872 
*** 
0.713 
*** 
0.093 
*** 
Note: Significant at ***p<0.001 
   
     
 
 
